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Uncharted Waters: Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Disputes after D.R. Horton 
Michael Mangels
1
 
I: Introduction 
 Michael Cuda went to work as a superintendent for a home building company named 
D.R. Horton in 2005.
2
  In 2006, D.R. Horton required each new and current employee, including 
Mr. Cuda, to sign a Mutual Arbitration Agreement (MAA), which provided that “all disputes and 
claims relating to the employee’s employment with Respondent will be determined exclusively 
by final and binding arbitration.”3  Generally, employment arbitration is a hearing where both 
parties present their cases in front of a neutral fact finder.
4
  The neutral fact finder then makes a 
decision as to which party’s position is correct.  An arbitrator’s decision is generally binding on 
both parties, but the effect of the decision is determined by the agreement of the parties.  
Arbitration is a way to resolve disputes through contract as opposed to a court.
5
  It is 
distinguishable from a courtroom trial, because the formalities, such as rules of evidence and 
various discovery procedures, can be, and generally are, waived through the underlying 
arbitration agreement.  In arbitration, an arbitrator is limited to interpreting the contract; not 
fulfilling the role of a judge.
6
   
In the case of D.R. Horton, the MAA stated that the individual could not consolidate his 
claims with another employee, and that the arbitrator could not provide class-based relief.
7
  In 
2008, Mr. Cuda felt that he had been misclassified as an “exempt employee” under the Fair 
                                                          
1
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4
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Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and was thereby denied his right to overtime under the FLSA.
8
  As 
a result, he hired a lawyer who attempted to initiate arbitration on both his behalf and the entire 
class of similarly situated superintendents.
9
  In response to Mr. Cuda’s notice of intent to initiate 
arbitration, the employer, D.R. Horton, maintained that Mr. Cuda’s lawyer did not file an 
effective notice of intent to arbitrate because the arbitration agreement did not recognize class 
claims.
10
  Due to the lack of coverage, Mr. Cuda would have been forced to pursue his FLSA 
claim individually in arbitration. 
 Instead of accepting the individual arbitration procedure, Mr. Cuda attempted to attack 
the agreement.
11
  Specifically, in November of 2008, Mr. Cuda filed an Unfair Labor Practice 
with the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”).12  The Board issued a complaint, and 
after a November 2010 trial, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the agreement 
unenforceable.  First, the judge found that the MAA did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
13
 of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by prohibiting class or collective litigation.
14
  Second, the 
judge found that D.R. Horton did violate Section 8(a)(4)
15
 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA through the 
MAA because the text of the MAA would reasonably lead employees to believe that they were 
not able to file charges with the Board.
16
 
 Both the employer, D.R. Horton, and the Board’s General Counsel appealed the 
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U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). 
14
 D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at *23. 
15
 Section 8(a)(4) states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to “discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(4) (2006). 
16
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decision.
17
  In January of 2012, the Board ruled to uphold the Judge’s finding of the 8(a)(4) 
violation because employees could reasonably interpret the MAA to interfere with access to the 
Board.
18
  The Board, however, reversed the Judge’s decision that the class action waiver was not 
a violation of Section 8(a)(1).
19
  Instead, the Board held that the class waiver was a restriction on 
employees’ right under the NLRA to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . .  
mutual aid or protection.”20 
 D.R. Horton appealed both of the Board’s holdings to the Fifth Circuit.21  While the Fifth 
Circuit will be deciding both questions, this note will only consider whether the class waiver 
violates § 8(a)(1).  The Board’s decision in D.R. Horton must now be a part of any discussion of 
enforceability of a class action waiver.  This note will be directed to that question. 
 If the class waiver was a simple contract and not contained within the MAA, the question 
would be much easier.  Due to the class waiver’s inclusion within an arbitration agreement, this 
case implicates another federal statute in addition to the NLRA.  The Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) provides that “[a] written provision . . . evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”22  Various legal 
challenges to agreements to arbitrate have reached the Supreme Court.
23
  The agreements have 
been challenged for being inconsistent with the administrative enforcement scheme,
24
 too 
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complex to arbitrate,
25
 or for amounting to a waiver of rights that is unconscionable.
26
  In all of 
these cases, the Supreme Court enforced the arbitration agreement over the particular objection.
27
  
Specifically, the Supreme Court has said that an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim will be 
enforced unless “Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies.”28  The Court has stated that there are multiple ways to discover Congress’s intention29 
not to permit arbitration including:  an examination of the statutory text; the legislative history; 
or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.30 
 This leaves Mr. Cuda in murky waters.  Although he has a right under the NLRA to 
challenge his classification as an “exempt employee” through collective activity, the MAA that 
he signed limits him to individual action.
31
  Therefore his right under the NLRA to challenge his 
classification through collective legal activity is in tension with the FAA’s preference to enforce 
the MAA that he signed as written.  The question is whether the NLRA qualifies as one of those 
grounds “as exist at law or in equity” that warrant an exception to the FAA’s preference toward 
enforcement, and make the agreement unenforceable.  If the MAA was found unenforceable, Mr. 
Cuda would have an opportunity to challenge his employment classification through some sort of 
collective legal action.
32
 
 This comment will consider the most recent, and likely most significant, challenge to the 
FAA.  Part II will explain the FAA, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, and when a valid 
arbitration agreement is not enforceable.  Next, Part III will explain Section 7 of the NLRA and 
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 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
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begin to define the conflict between Section 7’s protection of concerted activity and the FAA’s 
preference for individual arbitration.  Then, Part IV will explain the NLRB’s decision in D.R. 
Horton that class waivers in arbitration agreements signed as a condition of employment are 
unenforceable as a violation of employees’ labor rights.  Part V will describe and analyze court 
decisions that have considered the Board’s holding in D.R. Horton.  Finally, Part VI will 
conclude that the Fifth Circuit should affirm the Board’s decision when it considers it on appeal.   
II: The Federal Arbitration Act and Pro-Arbitration Policy 
A. Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act. 
 The operative clause of the FAA reads, “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction 
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”33  Additionally, much like agreements to arbitrate contract disputes, agreements to 
arbitrate statutory claims are also enforceable by courts.
34
  The Supreme Court has held that an 
agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim is enforceable unless Congress intended to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.
35
  While many parties have turned to 
arbitration to solve disputes, many others have challenged the enforceability of various types of 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
36
 
B. Legal Challenges to the Federal Arbitration Act 
While numerous challenges to arbitration agreements have reached the Supreme Court, 
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the most significant cases with respect to the pending challenge in D.R. Horton are Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and Compucredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood. 
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.37 
A Japanese and Swiss joint venture disputed an agreement to ship and sell automobiles 
with a Puerto Rican company, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
38
  
After the dispute arose, the Japanese and Swiss joint venture sued to compel arbitration pursuant 
to the agreement between the parties.
39
  The Puerto Rican company counter-claimed alleging, 
among other claims, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
40
  The District Court granted the 
joint venture’s motion to compel arbitration of all the issues presented by the dispute, including 
the antitrust issues.
41
 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reversed the order to 
compel arbitration of the antitrust claims.
42
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the 
issue.
43
 
The Supreme Court held that the language of parties’ agreement to arbitrate disputes 
should be read broadly to favor the arbitration of issues.
44
  The Court clarified that the general 
presumption that there is a presumption that arbitration agreements cover all disputes including 
rights provided through statute.
45
  The Court, while holding that agreements should be read 
broadly to include statutory rights within the agreement of what can be arbitrated, clarified that 
                                                          
37
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38
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Congress can make agreements to arbitrate any statutory claim unenforceable.
46
  If Congress 
intends to include protection against waiving a judicial forum, it will make that intention clear 
either in the text of the statute or in the legislative history.
47
  Thus, once a party makes an 
agreement to arbitrate a dispute over a statutory right, it should be enforced unless Congress 
intended to prohibit the waiver of judicial remedies.
48
 
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected certain attacks on agreements to arbitrate statutory 
disputes.
49
  While an arbitration agreement that resulted from “fraud, undue influence, or 
overweening bargaining power” would be unenforceable, the Court would not assume that every 
arbitration agreement results from those inequities.
50
  Additionally, the Court would not presume 
that arbitration panels either lack the ability to effectively arbitrate a matter or that they will be 
hostile to a party.
51
  Finally, the fact that a statute contains an important public policy does not 
itself make the statute inappropriate for arbitration.
52
  “So long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”53 
After Mitsubishi, it was clear that the mere presence of a right within a statute was 
insufficient to defeat an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over that right.
54
  The Court, however, 
made it equally clear that it would not enforce any arbitration agreement.
55
  Two aspects of this 
decision are crucial to the pending case of D.R. Horton.  First, the Court made clear that some 
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statutory rights may be unavailable for arbitration, if Congress makes that intent clear.
56
  Second, 
the Court explicitly held that traditional defenses to contracts such as fraud and duress apply 
even to arbitration agreements.
57
 
2. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 
Gilmer, the Plaintiff in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., thought that his 
employer terminated him on account of his age.
58
  Before the dispute arose, the plaintiff 
registered with the New York Stock Exchange, which was required in order for him to secure 
employment.
59
  Included in the plaintiff’s registration application with the Stock Exchange was 
an agreement to arbitrate any dispute with his employer arising out of employment or 
termination of employment.
60
  Plaintiff was terminated at the age of sixty-two and filed a charge 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming a violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
61
  Plaintiff then brought suit against Interstate, his 
employer, alleging a violation of the ADEA.
62
  Interstate moved to compel arbitration.
63
  The 
District Court denied the motion, but the Fourth Circuit reversed because it did not find that 
Congress intended to preclude enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under the ADEA.
64
 
Plaintiff argued that the compulsory arbitration of claims would be inconsistent with the 
statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA.
65
  Specifically, he argued that enforcing the 
arbitration agreement would undermine the important social policy advanced by the ADEA of 
                                                          
56
 Id. at 628. 
57
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58
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59
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preventing discrimination.
66
  Plaintiff also claimed that enforcing the arbitration agreement 
would undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA.
67
  Additionally, plaintiff 
contended that Congress provided a judicial forum for the ADEA, and therefore compulsory 
arbitration is improper because it deprived individuals of this forum.
68
 
The Supreme Court rejected all of plaintiff’s arguments.  First, the Court made clear that 
although arbitration focuses on specific disputes, judicial resolution of a claim also focuses on 
the specific dispute in front of the court.
69
  Both of these mechanisms to resolve disputes can 
further important social policies;
70
 so long as a claimant can still pursue her cause of action in 
some forum, the statute still serves its remedial and deterrent functions.
71
 
Secondly, the Supreme Court was not persuaded that enforcing an arbitration agreement 
would interfere with an executive agency’s role in enforcing a statute.72  Prior to the EEOC 
bringing a suit, the agency is tasked with using “informal methods of conciliation, conference, 
and persuasion” to bring about voluntary compliance with the statute.73  Additionally, even if 
someone is subject to an arbitration agreement, she is still free to file a charge with the EEOC.
74
  
Also, the EEOC is not limited to enforcement actions by individuals who file charges with the 
agency; the EEOC has independent authority to investigate claims of discrimination.
75
 
Furthermore, the Court found that there was no evidence that Congress intended to 
preclude waiver of the judicial forum under the statute.
76
  The Court stated that had Congress 
                                                          
66
 See id. 
67
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70
 Gilmer 500 U.S. at 28. 
71
 Id at 28. 
72
 Id. 
73
 See id. at 27. 
74
 Id. at 28. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29. 
10 
 
intended to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, it would have been 
made clear in either the text or legislative history.
77
  Instead, the Court found that Congress 
intended for parties to resolve claims flexibly.
78
  The Court again cited to the legislative 
provision that requires the EEOC to first pursue voluntary compliance prior to initiating 
proceedings against an employer.
79
  Plaintiff could not establish that Congress intended to 
protect the right to a judicial forum against waiver, and there was a great deal of evidence that 
Congress intended to encourage informal settlement over judicial proceedings. 
Plaintiff advanced a second attack against the arbitration agreement.  He argued that the 
procedural protections provided by arbitration were inconsistent with the ADEA.
80
  First, he 
argued that the arbitration panels would be biased.
81
  He also argued that the limited discovery 
provided by arbitration would be insufficient to prove discrimination.
82
  In addition, he argued 
that a failure to issue written opinions will undermine both public knowledge of employer 
practices and the ability to obtain effective appellate review of an arbitration panel’s decision.83  
Finally, he challenged arbitration procedures because they generally do not provide for broad 
equitable relief or class actions.
84
 
The Supreme Court rejected these attacks, and made clear that it will not strike down 
arbitration agreements based on assumptions about insufficient procedural protections within 
arbitration, because they “are far out of step with [the Court’s] current strong endorsement of the 
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.”85 
                                                          
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 29. 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. at 30. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31. 
83
 Id. at 31˗32. 
84
 Id. at 32. 
85
 Id. at 30. 
11 
 
As to plaintiff’s claim of bias, the Court refused to entertain a presumption of bias.86  
Additionally, the New York Stock Exchange rules, which governed Gilmer’s specific arbitration 
agreement, contained protections against biased panels.
87
  The parties were to be informed of the 
arbitrators’ backgrounds, and each party was allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited 
challenges for cause.
88
  Finally, there was no need to prospectively protect against bias because 
courts can overturn decisions of arbitrators where there is “evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators.”89 
The Court was also deeply skeptical about the discovery argument
90
 because the Court 
could not see why discrimination claims needed more extensive discovery than claims under 
either the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) or the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, both of which it had previously held were arbitrable.
91
  In plaintiff’s case, the agreement 
provided various discovery type protections.  For example, the rules that governed plaintiff’s 
arbitration with the New York Stock Exchange provided for document production, information 
requests, depositions, and subpoenas, making the permissible discovery quite extensive and less 
problematic.
92
  Finally, the Court explained that part of the tradeoff for more limited discovery is 
the increased simplicity, informality, and expeditious nature of the proceedings.
93
  Additionally, 
the court held that even if an agreement did not require a written opinion, that alone was not a 
reason to find an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim unenforceable.
94
 
Plaintiff also attacked arbitration agreements contained in employment agreements more 
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broadly.
95
  Gilmer argued that employers and employees will frequently have unequal bargaining 
power.
96
  He argued that due to this inequality, arbitration agreements arising out of employment 
relationships should not be enforced.
97
 
The Court also held that this was insufficient to strike down the agreement.  Mere 
inequality in bargaining power is not enough to hold that employment arbitration agreements are 
never enforceable.
98
  While courts should still strike down an agreement if it resulted from “the 
sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of 
any contract,”99 there is no per se rule that an arbitration agreement in an employment context is 
unenforceable.
100
 
The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument claiming that the agreement was 
unenforceable because it did not provide for class action.  The Court held that any concerns 
about collective action were not implicated in Gilmer because the rules of arbitration through the 
Stock Exchange did not limit the type of relief that an arbitrator could provide, and in fact the 
rules explicitly allowed for collective proceedings.
101
  The Court stated that “even if the 
arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be granted by the 
arbitrator, the fact that the ADEA provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does 
not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred;”102 however, it also 
noted that these agreements would not bar the EEOC from bringing an action seeking class-wide 
and equitable relief.
103
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The collective action language is likely the most significant for D.R. Horton.  However, it 
is important to note two things.  First, plaintiff was suing in his individual capacity and therefore 
the issue was not before the court.  Additionally, the provision involved in the ADEA is an opt-in 
provision as opposed to a non-waivable provision like Section 8(a)(1).
104
 
Consequently, as a result of Gilmer, a court will only refuse to enforce an agreement to 
arbitrate a right contained within a federal statute if (1) the defense is one that applies to a 
contract at law, or (2) if Congress intended to prohibit waiver of a judicial forum.
105
  Moreover, 
the court left open three ways to discover this intention: legislative text, legislative history, or an 
“inherent conflict” between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.106 
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion107 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the plaintiffs attacked a consumer arbitration 
agreement.
108
  The agreement required that all relevant disputes be arbitrated and could only be 
brought in the disputant’s individual capacity.109  Plaintiffs sued as a class alleging 
misrepresentation of phone prices, and AT&T moved to compel arbitration.
110
  The District 
Court denied the motion based on California’s doctrine of unconscionability.111  The doctrine 
had three requirements:  (1) a consumer contract of adhesion;
112
 (2) involving predictably small 
amounts of money; and (3) a plaintiff must allege that the party with superior bargaining power 
executed a scheme to “deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small 
                                                          
104
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sums of money.”113  If those three requirements are met, then, according to California, the 
agreement works to exempt the party from responsibility for its conduct, and is therefore 
unconscionable.
114
 
The plaintiffs argued that because the class waiver doctrine applies both to arbitration 
agreements and to contracts regulating lawsuits, the FAA did not apply.
115
  The Court rejected 
this argument.
116
  First, it expanded the application of the FAA, stating that the FAA’s 
preemptive effect may extend “even to grounds traditionally thought to exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”117  The Court compared the instant situation to a doctrine that 
found agreements unconscionable if they did not provide for judicially monitored discovery.
118
  
Thus, it expanded the analysis to preclude doctrines that not only directly target arbitration, but 
also those that would disproportionately affect arbitration agreements.
119
  Ultimately, the FAA 
was interpreted to prohibit a state’s preference for procedures that are incompatible with 
arbitration, due to preemption.
120
 
Next, the Court expansively defined the purpose of the FAA as ensuring that arbitration 
agreements are enforced according to their terms in order to facilitate streamlined proceedings.
121
  
Because class proceedings require procedural protections, it is inconsistent with the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration, and therefore a doctrine prohibiting class waivers is pre-empted by the 
FAA.
122
  As a result, while the savings clause of the FAA permits defenses to contracts as exist 
at law or equity, that clause does not apply to contract defenses based in state law that have a 
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disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.
123
 
4. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood124 
In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood plaintiffs attacked an agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute in a credit repair service agreement.
125
  The plaintiffs sued in district court under the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act, and the company moved to compel arbitration.
126
  The court 
denied the motion, concluding that Congress intended claims under the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act to be non-arbitrable.
127
 
The Supreme Court on review, reiterated that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims 
should be enforced according to their terms even if the claim is based on a federal statute.
128
  
Congress can override the FAA’s presumption, however, if it gives a contrary command.129 
The plaintiffs in CompuCredit asserted that Congress gave that contrary command, 
focusing on the specific language in the statute.
130
  One provision in the statute required that a 
credit repair organization provide a statement to the consumer prior to executing a contract.
131
  
One sentence in that statement read: “[Y]ou have a right to sue a credit repair organization that 
violates the Credit Repair Organization Act.”132  Another provision in the statute read that any 
waiver by any consumer of any “protection provided by or any right of the consumer under this 
subchapter” (1) shall be treated as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State 
court or any other person.
133
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Despite this language, the Supreme Court found no Congressional intent to preclude 
waiver of a judicial forum.
134
  It determined that the right created by the statute was a right to 
receive the statement outlining the rights within the statute, not the right to bring an action in a 
court.
135
  Additionally, the use of words such as “action,” “class action,” and “court” are not 
sufficient even when used throughout a statute to create a non-waivable right to a judicial 
forum.
136
 
C. Summary of the Defenses 
Despite these decisions and many others challenging arbitration agreements that apply to 
statutory claims, the Court has left open a few avenues of attack.  First, Congress can prohibit 
parties from waiving judicial remedies for particular federal statutory rights.
137
  Congress does 
not have to do this explicitly in the text of the statute; Congressional intent can be found in an 
act’s text, the legislative history, or “an inherent conflict between arbitration and [the statute’s] 
underlying purposes.”138  The Court has recently raised the bar for this defense, and requires a 
contrary congressional demand.
139
  Second, an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim can be 
attacked based on “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”140  In 
fact, the Court specifically left open defenses based on fraud and duress.
141
  While generally 
applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability are available as a 
defense against an arbitration agreement, agreements cannot be invalidated by defenses that 
“apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate 
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is at issue.”142  Given that class treatment is inconsistent with the FAA’s policy of enforcing 
arbitration agreements according to their terms, states cannot coerce class arbitration through its 
doctrine of unconscionability.
143
 
 Two defenses are available to the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate a statutory 
right.  First, arbitration agreements are automatically unenforceable if Congress precluded 
waiver of the right under the statute.
144
  Importantly, the right must be a covered right under the 
statute, and not merely a right to have a claim heard.
145
  If the only right being waived is the right 
to a judicial forum, then Congress must use explicit language that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements are unenforceable for the specific statutory claims at issue.
146
  Absent such explicit 
language, an arbitration agreement is enforceable.
147
  The Supreme Court has not held that any 
statutory right can be waived by an arbitration agreement.  Instead, the Court generally finds that 
no statutory right is at issue.
148
  It will classify the provision as a forum selection question, and 
will enforce the agreement.
149
  The remaining defense is grounds as exist at law or in equity.
150
  
If the source of the legal or equitable ground is state law, however, it cannot be based on a mere 
distaste for arbitration.
151
  Thus, while a state cannot pass a law, or hold a common law doctrine 
that is inconsistent with the FAA, presumably Congress may still pass a statute that is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the FAA, making an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable in 
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certain circumstances.
152
 
III: Section 7: Concerted Activity and Legal Action 
A. Overview of Section 7 Protection 
 For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant provision of the NLRA is Section 7, 
which grants statutory employees
153
 the right to engage in concerted activities for the “purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”154  The Board requires two elements for 
activity to be protected under the statute.
155
   
First the activity must be “concerted.”156  There are two types of “concerted” activities.157  
Action by a group is always a type of concerted activity,
158
 but action by an individual can also 
be considered “concerted.”159  The applicable test is whether an activity is engaged in “with or 
on the authority of other employees,” and not “solely on behalf of the employee himself.”160 
This leaves two types of individual action covered by the term “concerted.”  One type of 
individual action is where an individual employee seeks to initiate or prepare for group action.
161
  
This includes actions such as circulating a petition, or simply discussing the possibility of 
initiating group action with another employee.
162
  Additionally, “concerted activity” includes 
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situations where an individual brings a group complaint to the attention of management.
163
  To 
qualify under this category, the individual employee must at a minimum engage in discussions 
with other employees, even though there is no explicit requirement that the individual be 
“authorized” to speak on behalf of others in some formal agency sense.164  In fact, even if the 
group initiating the complaint in the presence of the individual employee does not know what the 
employee plans to do, the activity may still be “concerted.”165 
 Second, the activity must be for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”166  This phrase 
reaches activities by employees that seek to improve working conditions.
167
  The phrase also has 
a broad reach in terms of where the activity takes place.  The Supreme Court, in Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB, has held that Congress did not wish to limit the statute’s protection to concerted activity 
that took place within the immediate employer-employee relationship.
168
  This is why Congress 
included the broader language of “mutual aid or protection” after it had used both “self-
organization” and “collective bargaining” within Section 7 of the NLRA.169  The Court explicitly 
held that the NLRA protects employees from retaliation by their employer when they attempt to 
improve working conditions by using either a judicial or administrative forum.
170
 
B. Section 7 and D.R. Horton 
The above two sections have set up the potential conflict.  The MAA at issue in D.R. 
Horton prohibited individuals from pursuing any dispute resolution channel other than 
arbitration that was agreed upon in the MAA.
171
  In that agreement, the employees were 
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prohibited from consolidating claims.
172
  When Mr. Cuda filed his notice of intent to arbitrate his 
dispute, he alleged that he was denied his statutory right to overtime due to being misclassified 
as “exempt.”173  Consequently, his suit, which was seeking additional pay, sought to improve his 
working conditions by restoring his right to overtime pay.
174
  As a result, this action fell within 
the “for the purpose of mutual aid and protection” prong because it was directed to improve 
working conditions.  
175
  Additionally, he filed a notice of intent to arbitrate representing a class 
of “similarly situated superintendents.”176  This suit was therefore “concerted” because it was an 
action by an individual employee seeking to initiate or prepare for group action.
177
  Although the 
MAA prohibited action within the protection of Section 7 of the NLRA, the question in front of 
the Board was whether the presence of an arbitration agreement, and therefore the federal policy 
promoting individual arbitration of disputes, meant that the Section 7 restriction was somehow 
lawful. 
IV: D.R. Horton -- Collective Action and Arbitration Agreements 
A. Facts of the Case 
D. R. Horton was a homebuilder with operations in multiple states.
178
  In 2006, it decided 
to condition employment on the signing of the MAA.
179
  The MAA provided (1) that all disputes 
relating to employment will be determined by final and binding arbitration, (2) that the arbitrator 
only had the authority to hear the claims of an individual employee and could not consolidate 
claims of employees or fashion relief as a class or group of employees in one proceeding, and (3) 
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that the signatory employee waived the right to file a lawsuit or other civil remedy.
180
 
Michael Cuda, employed by D.R. Horton as a superintendent, decided to challenge his 
status as “exempt”181 from the protections of the FLSA.182  His attorney gave notice of intent to 
initiate arbitration on behalf of Michael Cuda and a nationwide class of similarly situated 
superintendents.
183
  The employer responded that the notice was ineffective, citing the provision 
of the MAA stating that the arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not 
have the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a 
group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding.”184  Michael Cuda then filed an Unfair 
Labor Practice charge with the Board.
185
  The ALJ found that the Employer violated Section 
8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA
186
 because the MAA’s language could be reasonably interpreted to 
prohibit access to the Board’s procedures.187  The ALJ did not find that the MAA violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
188
   because there was no direct Board precedent, and recent 
Supreme Court pronouncements made it clear that arbitration was a matter of consent.
189
  
Consequently, the ALJ did not find that the MAA’s bar of class or collective activity itself 
violated the Act.
190
 
B. The Board’s Holding that Class Action Waivers Contained in Arbitration Agreements 
are Unfair Labor Practices 
 
The Board reached its holding under a multi-step process.  First, it found that employees 
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have a right to engage in class-wide or collective litigation either in court or before an 
arbitrator.
191
  Second, the MAA, which constituted a workplace rule, explicitly prohibited 
exercising this type of protected activity, making it unlawful.
192
  Third, it held that the fact that 
the employee agreed to the restriction of Section 7 activity was irrelevant to the analysis because 
Section 7 rights are not waivable by contract.
193
  Fourth, the Board found that its holding was not 
in conflict with the FAA
194
 because the FAA expressly permits traditional equitable and legal 
defenses to their enforceability.
195
 
1. Section 7 Protects Class-Wide or Collective Litigation and Arbitration 
The Board began by clarifying that employees have a right to engage in collective or 
class-wide litigation, which is protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.
196
  Section 7’s protection 
extends beyond the workplace,
197
 and in fact, the court expressly stated that employees are 
protected when they resort to administrative or judicial forums.
198
   
Furthermore, Section 7 extends beyond judicial and administrative forums, and includes 
advancing a collective workplace grievance through arbitration.
199
  This would be true either if a 
collective bargaining agreement created an arbitration procedure, or if the procedure was 
unilaterally imposed by the employer, as was the case in D.R. Horton.
200
  If the employee was 
pursuing a collective workplace grievance through an arbitration mechanism that was created 
through a collective bargaining agreement, it would be considered an “ongoing process of 
                                                          
191
 Id. at *2˗4. 
192
 Id. at *6. 
193
 D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at *6. 
194
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
195
See D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at *11. 
196
 Id. at *3. 
197
 Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565˗566 (1978). 
198
 Id. 
199
 D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B., at *3. 
200
 Id. at *5. 
23 
 
employee concerted activity.”201  In the present case, however, the employee was attempting to 
advance a grievance about misclassification that affected numerous employees through an 
arbitration mechanism that was unilaterally imposed by the employer.
202
  The pursuit of the 
grievance was “concerted,” and therefore the employee’s activity was protected, because a single 
individual advanced the grievance attempting to initiate group action.
203
 
2. Section 8(a)(1) Makes Restrictions of the Right to Collective or Class 
Litigation and Arbitration Unlawful 
 
Section 7 of the NLRA protects the pursuit of collective workplace grievances through 
either litigation or arbitration.
204
  Section 8(a)(1) of NLRA goes further and makes it unlawful 
for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in” Section 7.205   
In D.R. Horton, employment was conditioned on signing the MAA, so the Board 
analyzed the MAA as a unilaterally imposed workplace rule.
206
  There is a two-step inquiry for 
unilaterally imposed workplace rules.
207
  The first inquiry is whether the rule explicitly restricts 
Section 7 activity.
208
  If it does, the rule is unlawful.
209
  If the rule does not explicitly restrict 
Section 7 activities, then a reviewing party would analyze whether: (1) employees would 
reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in 
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 
rights.
210
  If any of those three factors are met, then the rule is unlawful.
211
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The Board held that the MAA explicitly restricted Section 7 activity, and was therefore 
unlawful.
212
  This was a straightforward holding for the Board.  Section 7 provided a right to 
engage in either collective litigation or arbitration.
213
  The MAA, which was a unilaterally 
imposed workplace rule, expressly prohibited both by mandating that all claims go to arbitration 
and by prohibiting the arbitrator from consolidating claims.
214
  As a result, the MAA expressly 
restricted Section 7 activity. 
3. Section 7 Rights Cannot be Waived by Individual Agreements 
The fact that the employee agreed to the MAA was irrelevant to the Board’s analysis.215  
The Board began its discussion by citing four cases where it held that individual contracts where 
the employee gave up Section 7 rights were unlawful even when the employee received valuable 
consideration, such as subscriptions to a stock purchase plan.
216
  Then, the Board proceeded to 
discuss two different Supreme Court cases that held that individual contracts that restrict rights 
under the NLRA are unenforceable.
217
  In National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,
218
 the Court held that a 
contract that simply discouraged a discharged employee from presenting a grievance “through a 
labor organization or his chosen representative, or in any way except personally” was 
unenforceable and unlawful because it was a means of avoiding the NLRA’s policy.219  The 
Court stated that employers cannot frustrate the NLRA by “inducing their workmen to agree not 
to demand performance of the duties which it imposes.”220   
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The Court later reaffirmed this principle in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
221
 stating that 
“wherever private contracts conflict with the Board’s functions of preventing unfair labor 
practices, they obviously must yield or the [NLRA] would be reduced to a futility.”222  In fact, 
the Board had decided a case with similar facts much earlier.  In J.H. Stone & Sons,
223
 the Board 
held an arbitration clause unlawful.
224
  There, the employment agreement required the employee 
to agree to individually arbitrate any claim in the event of continued disagreement with her 
employer.
225
  The Board struck down the agreement reasoning that it denied the employee the 
right to act collectively at the earliest stage of the dispute, and compelled the employee to pit her 
“individual bargaining strength against the superior bargaining power of the employer.”226 
The fact that the employees retained other rights protected by Section 7 is insufficient to 
save the MAA.
227
  For example, any agreement where an employee not covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement waives the right to strike is unlawful.
228
  It does not matter if the employer 
permits the employee to bring forward grievances, petition to improve working conditions, or 
simply engage in discussions with other employees.
229
  Once the employer forces the employees 
to give up their right to strike, the agreement is per se unlawful.
230
  Just as the strike is a means 
for realizing the demands protected by Section 7 through the exertion of collective pressure and 
equalizing bargaining positions, so too is engaging in collective litigation or arbitration. 
4. The Board’s Holding Does Not Conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act 
Finally, the Board held that its decision that the MAA was an unlawful restriction of 
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Section 7 activity did not conflict with the FAA or the liberal pro-arbitration policy implied 
under the FAA.
231
  While courts are not required to defer to this holding, as it is outside of the 
Board’s realm of expertise,232 the Board’s reasoning is instructive nonetheless. 
The Board stated that the purpose of the FAA was to reverse the longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements and to place them on the same footing as other contracts.
233
  
The Board conceded that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration.”234  Despite this, the Board recognized that arbitration 
agreements to resolve statutory claims in an arbitral forum are not enforceable if a party forgoes 
the substantive rights given by the statute.
235
  The Board found that there was no conflict 
between the FAA and the NLRA, in the alternative it reasoned that if there was a conflict 
between the two statutes, the NLRA’s protection should lead to non-enforcement of the MAA.236  
The Board advanced three arguments in support of its holding that the FAA was not in conflict 
with the NLRA.
237
 
First, the Board argued that recognizing a right under Section 7 did not uniquely affect 
arbitration, and therefore did not frustrate the purpose of the FAA.
238
  The Board reached this 
conclusion through a two-step process.
239
  First, it narrowly defined the pro-arbitration policy of 
the FAA as preventing courts from treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other 
private contracts.
240
  Next, it cited and discussed prior court precedent, finding that when private 
contracts conflict with the NLRA, they must yield to the NLRA or the NLRA would be reduced 
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to a futility.
241
  Moreover, the Board found that the MAA would have been just as unlawful if it 
allowed access to the courts but required that all litigation claims be pursued individually.
242
  
Since the agreement would have been unlawful had it said nothing about arbitration, the Board 
found that its holding did not undermine the strong pro-arbitration policy of the FAA.
243
 
The Board did not enforce the agreement for a second reason; the MAA actually 
precluded the exercise of substantive rights under federal law.
244
  While Congress intended the 
FAA to compel courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, the Board 
found that the savings clause contained in the FAA
245
 allowed for defenses in law and equity.
246
  
Given that the employees here were being required to waive rights guaranteed to them under the 
NLRA, the Board found that these rights were not merely procedural, but constituted “the core 
substantive right protected by the NLRA.”247 The Board read Gilmer to preclude enforcement of 
an arbitration agreement, if enforcement would require waiving a statutory right.
248
  While 
Gilmer upheld an agreement to arbitrate a claim under a statute that involved a provision that 
provided for a collective action, the Board distinguished Gilmer on its facts, indicating that the 
claim in Gilmer was an individual claim.
249
  Thus, Gilmer’s holding that employees can 
effectively vindicate their statutory rights under the ADEA through arbitration is inapplicable to 
the MAA’s legality.250  Instead, the Board clarified that the relevant question was whether 
employers can condition employment on employees waiving their statutory right to engage in 
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collective legal action on matters that touch terms and conditions of employment.
251
 
Third, the Board held that in accommodating the competing policies,
252
 the substantive 
rights provided by the NLRA outweigh the interest promoted by the FAA in an employment 
arbitration agreement, and therefore, which weighed in favor of non-enforcement of the MAA.
253
  
It was in this context of the balancing that the Board considered the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
254
  
The Board interpreted Section 8(a)(1)’s provision making employer restriction of collective 
action unlawful as an extension of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s prohibition of “yellow-dog 
contracts,” which coerced employees to agree not to join a union in exchange for employment.255    
The Board found that the Norris La-Guardia Act “manifested a strong federal policy protecting 
employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted action, including collective pursuit of 
litigation or arbitration.”256  Furthermore, the Board recognized the tension between the NLRA 
and the FAA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Concepcion as “ensuring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”257  
Despite this tension, the Board found that in the specific circumstances, enforcing the MAA 
would impact the federal policy promoting collective action rights of employees more 
significantly than not enforcing the MAA would impact the pro-arbitration policy for two 
reasons.
258
  First, the Board’s holding is limited to a specific class, namely employers and 
employees covered under the NLRA.
259
   Second, given the limited scope of the Board’s holding, 
the concerns about interfering with the streamlined proceedings of arbitration were less likely to 
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be present in a proceeding.
260
  Employment disputes are limited by the physical workplace, 
where consumer disputes, such as those presented in Concepcion, are much larger.
261
  Due to the 
smaller scale of employment disputes, they do not raise the same concerns about procedures as 
were implicated in Concepcion.
262
  In the context of the MAA, these two elements combined to 
favor the NLRA over the FAA.
263
 
V: Horton goes to Court 
 The Board’s holding in Horton created a conflict within the Federal courts.264  More 
specifically, many courts are not following the Board’s reasoning, and instead are enforcing 
arbitration agreements comparable to the MAA in Horton.
265
  In contrast, other courts are finding 
that class arbitration waiver provisions are unenforceable as an illegal restriction of Section 7 
activity.
266
 
A. Decisions Finding the Class Waivers Enforceable. 
 While numerous decisions in the lower courts since Horton have rejected its holding that 
class waivers in employment agreements are unlawful employment practices, two decisions 
provided in depth analysis regarding why the courts declined to follow the Board’s decision.  
Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro,267 involved two plaintiffs who brought a class action for 
various state law violations, including failure to provide meal and rest breaks, refusal to pay for 
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missed breaks, failure to pay overtime compensation that was due, and failure to provide 
accurate wage statements.
268
  The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an 
arbitration agreement that read, “[a]ny dispute arising out of or related to an Employee’s 
employment with P.F. Chang’s” must be “resolved only by an arbitrator through final and 
binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.”269  It also contained a class waiver 
stating, “there will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated” as 
a class action.”270  The court held that the inclusion of a class waiver is not grounds to hold an 
arbitration agreement unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
271
  In reaching this decision the 
court articulated a few reasons for declining to accept a public policy through the NLRA.
272
 
First, the court found that the Board moved outside its area of expertise in reaching its 
holding.
273
  The court also found that Gilmer exception preserving the “vindication of statutory 
rights” only applies when the agreement to arbitrate precludes vindicating the right under which 
a plaintiff brings suit.
274
  Finally, the court held that for a statute to preclude arbitration, 
Congress must expressly override the FAA.
275
 
 Similarly, Delock v. Securitas Securities Services USA, Inc.,
276
 dealt with whether to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, containing a class waiver similar to Horton and Morvant, over 
claims arising under the FLSA.
277
  The Delock decision is more interesting than Morvant 
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because the court deferred to the Section 7 reasoning of the Board.
278
  Despite the court’s finding 
of a Section 7 restriction, it still chose to enforce the class waiver.
279
  First, the Delock court 
criticized the Board’s historical argument, holding that the FAA was reenacted after the NLRA 
was reenacted.
280
  As a result, the court reasoned that because the FAA was reenacted after the 
NLRA, the NLRA’s provision repealing any previous existing contradictory laws does not 
resolve any conflict between the statutes.
281
   
The court then found that there is no “contrary congressional command,” as is required 
by CompuCredit, to override the FAA.
282
  It discovered this through a multi-step process.
283
  
First it analogized the NLRA’s protection of concerted activities to the FLSA’s provision 
offering employees a statutory provision for proceeding with a collective action, which the 
Gilmer court considered waivable.
284
  After that analogy, the Delock court held without further 
discussion that the NLRA’s text was insufficient to resolve the dispute in favor of making the 
class waiver unenforceable.
285
   
While the text did not provide the “clear congressional command,” the court found that 
there was a conflict between the purposes of the NLRA, collective action, and the FAA, 
individual dispute arbitration, but that the NLRA must bend to the FAA for a few reasons.
286
  As 
a preliminary matter, the court noted that collective arbitration cannot be manufactured, and 
relies on consent.
287
   Because class arbitration cannot be manufactured absent consent, any 
collective legal action that was to proceed could not move forward in arbitration unless the 
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agreement explicitly allowed it.
288
  As a result, the overall impact of finding the class waiver 
unenforceable would lead to more litigation and less arbitration, which conflicts with the federal 
policy favoring arbitral dispute resolution.
289
  Additionally, finding a class waiver unenforceable 
would lead to a legal patchwork as it would treat individual employees seeking to assert statutory 
rights differently merely because they joined a group.
290
  Lastly, it would have a far more 
sweeping impact on the law than the Board suggested in Horton, because it would affect every 
employment dispute as long as two employees make the complaint together.
291
  The Delock court 
took an unusual step in affirming the Board’s Section 7 holding, yet enforcing the agreement 
through finding that the FAA controlled in a conflict between the two statutory policies.
292
 
B. Decision Finding the Class Waivers Unenforceable 
In Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage. Corp.,
293
 the court decided not to enforce a class 
waiver contained in an arbitration agreement.
294
  This case also involved a claim under the FLSA 
and other state law claims.
295
  The court first held that although the NLRB generally has 
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce §157 and 158 of the NLRA,
296
 a federal court has authority to 
invalidate a contractual agreement that violates the NLRA.
297
  The court then deferred to the 
Board’s finding that collective legal action to improve terms and conditions of employment is 
covered by Section 7.
298
  In doing so, the court distinguished Concepcion because the preemption 
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analysis
299
 does not apply when dealing with a federal statute.
300
  After finding the class waiver 
unenforceable, the court held that because the provision was severable
301
 from the agreement, it 
would still compel arbitration, but on a collective basis.
302
   
C. Analysis of the Split in the District Courts 
While not all courts have recognized this, the first step in analyzing whether the NLRA 
makes an arbitration agreement unenforceable is whether it restricts activity protected by Section 
7.
303
  The Morvant court did not consider whether there was a possible NLRA violation under 
Section 8(a)(1), which leaves deficiencies in its holding.
304
  If there is no determination of 
whether Section 7 protects joint or collective litigation, then the question of a violation of federal 
law is never implicated.  In contrast to the Morvant court, the Delock court found that the 
Board’s reading of Section 7 was reasonable and therefore deferred.305  Similarly, the Herrington 
Court also found that the Board’s interpretation of Section 7 was reasonable, though it was much 
easier in that case because the defendant did not argue the issue.
306
  Interestingly, to date,
307
 no 
court has overturned the Board’s Section 7 holding.308  The Board’s Section 7 holding is central 
to an analysis of the legality of a class waiver.  Therefore, an analysis of the Board’s holding is 
necessary.   
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1. Section 7 Protects Joint or Collective Legal Action 
In D.R. Horton, The Board rested its Section 7 holding on Supreme Court precedent that 
expanded the area of employee protection outside the immediate employer-employee context and 
specifically protected court action.
309
  While the Board made clear that some sort of joint or 
collective legal action is protected by the NLRA, the Delock court goes even further giving 
express protection to class action lawsuits, if filed in good faith by a group of employees to 
achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment.
310
  The Section 7 issue is undisputed 
in all of the cases.  Each case involves a suit dealing with terms and conditions of employment 
which satisfies the “mutual aid or protection” clause, and the class waiver means that it prohibits 
suits by groups or by individuals acting on behalf of groups, satisfying the concerted action 
requirement.
311
  Importantly, there is no authority on point that contradicts the Board’s 
conclusion that the class waiver restricts action protected by Section 7.
312
 
2. Section 8(a)(1) Compels a Finding that Class Waivers are Unlawful 
After finding that an agreement violates Section 7, a reviewing court should next consider 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.
313
  It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, 
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights” guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA.314  
The arbitration agreements at issue in these cases restrain class or collective legal actions, which 
are protected by Section 7.
315
  This makes such agreements an “unfair labor practice.”316  Thus, 
federal courts are prohibited from enforcing the agreements, because federal courts are 
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prohibited from enforcing private contracts that violate a federal statute.
317
   
A federal court cannot exert its judicial power to enforce a contract that violates the 
public policy of the United States as expressed through federal statutes.
318
  The activities 
prohibited by the agreement are protected by Section 7.
319
  Section 8(a)(1) makes it unlawful for 
an employer to restrict Section 7 activity.
320
  This part of the inquiry is where the facts of each 
individual case begin to matter.  If the arbitration agreement is unilaterally imposed by the 
employer on the employees, then it is a work rule.
321
  What constitutes a mandatory arbitration 
agreement is outside the scope of this note, but if the agreement does not itself constitute a term 
or condition of employment, then the analysis would shift drastically.
322
  Returning to a case of a 
mandatory arbitration agreement that restricts Section 7 activity, it is clear that 8(a)(1) on its face 
would make the agreement an unfair labor practice.
323
  Therefore, courts should be entering their 
analyses of these arbitration provisions with the presumption that they unlawfully restrict federal 
rights.
324
 
Unfortunately some courts are confused because they have not begun from this set of 
propositions.
325
  Morvant, for example, went off into discussions about whether the statutory 
right being restricted is the one being sued under, and other issues that are not found within the 
doctrine.
326
 
The Delock court started with the finding of a Section 7 violation, but then proceeded to 
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enforce the agreement finding that there was a conflict between the NLRA and FAA, and that the 
NLRA must bend to the FAA, because the result of not enforcing the class waiver would be to 
cause more litigation and less arbitration in conflict with the clear policy of the FAA.
327
  There 
are two problems with this reasoning.  First, enforcing the class waiver means more individual 
dispute resolution and less collective action, which while not stated by the Delock court logically 
flows from its decision.
328
  Second, the court ignores both of the crucial statutory sections, 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, and the savings clause of the FAA.  The reasoning that the Delock 
court applied is lifted very closely from Concepcion.
329
  Surprisingly, the Delock court did not 
cite to Concepcion during its discussion of the disproportionate impact reasoning.
330
  Instead, the 
court discussed the Board’s reading of the NLRA having the effect of leading to more litigation 
and less arbitration, cited to the “strong federal policy promoting arbitration,” then held that the 
FAA controlled the conflict.
331
 
This pattern of analysis ignores the crucial question of whether these statutes even 
conflict.  Instead of jumping to the question of which statute controls in a conflict, these courts 
skipped over the important question of whether these statutes can be read in a way where they do 
not conflict.  The Board fulfilled that role when it attempted to accommodate the statutes.
332
 
The policy promoted by the FAA can be accommodated with the policies of the NLRA.  
The FAA expressly includes a savings clause within it.
333
  The NLRA does not contain a savings 
clause, but makes it clear that it intended to provide a non-waivable right when it makes attempts 
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by an employer to restrict activities protected by Section 7 unlawful.
334
 
By recognizing that agreements that restrict Section 7 rights are presumptively invalid 
under the NLRA, cases involving compelled arbitration become much easier to decide.  It is 
clear that the Supreme Court has been interpreting the FAA broadly to enforce arbitration 
agreements;
335
 however, the savings clause (save upon grounds such as exist at law or in equity) 
clearly controls this dispute.
336
  The court has not yet held that an arbitration agreement is 
enforceable if it restricts a federal statutory right.
337
  The court has not even held that an 
arbitration agreement is enforceable if it restricts a state statutory right.  The two closest cases 
are Concepcion and CompuCredit;
338
 however, both cases are distinguishable.   
Concepcion is likely the most sweeping pronouncement both of the purpose of the FAA 
and its reach.  At one point, the decision goes as far as stating, “the FAA’s preemptive effect 
might extend even to grounds traditionally thought to exist” ‘at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.’339  While this language is clearly expansive, even the most sweeping 
pronouncement of the FAA’s reach was limited to preemption.340  While in Concepcion, the 
Court struck down a state judicial doctrine that found class action waivers unconscionable due to 
their disproportionate effect on arbitration agreements;
 341
 when a federal statute is involved, 
constitutional preemption under the Supremacy clause is not involved in the analysis.
342
  Since 
preemption does not apply, courts are left with an agreement to arbitrate a dispute that is in 
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violation of a federal law.  Since the savings clause of the FAA says that agreements to arbitrate 
disputes should be enforced “save upon grounds as exist at law” there is no reason that the 
statutes need to be read to conflict. 
The other case that may give pause on this dispute is CompuCredit.  That case raised the 
bar on what constitutes an unwaivable right under federal law.
343
  It made clear that classifying 
something as a “right to sue” or using language that described judicial processes was insufficient 
to rise to the level of a “contrary congressional command” necessary to preclude waiver of a 
right to a judicial forum.
344
  The NLRA is quite distinct from the statute at issue in CompuCredit.  
The Court went out of its way in CompuCredit to classify the “right to sue” as merely a 
procedural right, or a type of forum selection.
345
  Unlike the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 
both the Court and the Board described Section 7 as a substantive protection.
346
 
This issue is uncharted water for the district courts.  It does not fit into the previous 
doctrine laid out by the court, but that is because the NLRA expressly provides an unwaivable 
substantive right.  Given that there is a federal law providing this right, the savings clause means 
that the FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration is inapplicable.  Just as the Court will not 
enforce an illegal contract, it should not enforce an unlawful arbitration agreement.  To hold 
otherwise would be to eviscerate congressional intent as expressed through the savings clause. 
VI: The Fifth Circuit Should Affirm the Board’s Decision 
As of the writing of this Comment, the Board’s decision is currently under appeal in the 
Fifth Circuit.
347
  The Fifth Circuit should affirm the Board’s decision in Horton because to 
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overturn it would drastically change the law currently governing both arbitration and labor 
relations.  Enforcing the decision would be much more predictable given current precedent.  
First, no Supreme Court decision has found that rights under a federal statute are subject to 
waiver simply because an arbitration agreement is involved.
348
  Second, both the Board and the 
Supreme Court have found that individual agreements that purport to waive labor rights are 
unenforceable.
349
  The current dispute is between one statute that grants rights that cannot be 
waived, and another statute that says agreements to follow a particular procedure to resolve 
disputes should be enforced as long as they do not conflict with any other law.  The statutes are 
not in conflict.   
While the broad language in Concepcion may give pause, the distinction between a state 
judicial doctrine, where preemption analysis applies, and a federal statutory right, where 
preemption analysis does not apply, is sufficient to truly distinguish these two cases.  
Additionally, in finding that rights provided under federal statutes were subject to arbitration, the 
courts classified the statutory provisions as forum selection clauses or procedural rights.
350
  At no 
point has the Supreme Court upheld a waiver of a truly substantive right.
351
  While resolving 
disputes collectively as opposed to individually may be perceived as a procedural right, 
Congress’s intent, as evidenced by the statute, sought to protect collective activity over 
individual activity because it felt that that the process of dispute resolution between employees 
and employers would improve working conditions and therefore have a positive impact on 
interstate commerce.
352
  The fact that some may now find that individual dispute resolution may 
be more efficient and costly is not a sufficient reason to disregard Congress’s intent that in 
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employment matters, the equalizing of bargaining positions is more important that the sanctity of 
contract. 
In Horton, the Board correctly applied the requisite steps to reach the proper conclusion.  
First, employees have a Section 7 right to engage in collective legal action.
353
  Joint litigation is 
concerted as well as class litigation that involves individual action seeking to initiate group 
action.
354
  Since the proposed action in Horton was both concerted and directed at improving 
workplace conditions, the conduct met the two prong test required under Section 7.
355
  Next, the 
Board found that agreements to waive Section 7 rights are unenforceable because they conflicted 
with a federal statutory policy,
356
 and are unlawful under Section 8(a)(1).
357
  The only element 
left was to attempt to accommodate the statutory policies of the NLRA with the FAA.
358
   
Here, the Board reached the correct decision that there is no conflict between its holding 
that the MAA’s class waiver is a violation of Section 7, and the underlying purposes of the FAA 
because of the savings clause within the FAA.
359
 
The Fifth Circuit should affirm the Board’s reconciliation of the NLRA and the FAA 
based on the Board’s decision.  An agreement is unenforceable if an arbitration agreement would 
violate the law due to the savings clause.  Due to the MAA’s restriction of Section 7 activity by 
an employer, the agreement is unlawful and unenforceable.  Alternatively, Supreme Court FAA 
jurisprudence will not enforce a waiver of rights contained in an arbitration agreement for which 
Congress intended to preclude waiver, and Section 7 is one of those provisions.   
FAA jurisprudence permitting enforcement of arbitration agreements makes clear that the 
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agreement “may not require a party to ‘forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.”360  
The Board distinguished Gilmer
361
 by clarifying that the agreement in question in that case did 
not contain a class waiver.
362
  On its face, the MAA restricts legitimate Section 7 activity 
because the employees were not allowed to engage in collective legal action on matters affecting 
the terms and conditions of employment, which is the substantive right provided by the 
NLRA.
363
  Unlike Gilmer, the MAA does not simply make a choice about a forum,
364
 but 
restricts a substantive protection.  Also unlike the ADEA involved in Gilmer, Congress’s intent 
in passing the NLRA was to decrease positional bargaining inequality between employers and 
employees.
365
  Thus, while in Gilmer the flexible and informal approach of arbitration was not in 
conflict with the ADEA’s encouragement of conciliation,366 here the arbitral preference of 
individual dispute resolution is in direct conflict with the NLRA’s preference for collective 
action by employees so as to decrease the inequality in bargaining power.
367
 
VI: Conclusion 
 Although the Supreme Court has consistently upheld arbitration agreements when it has 
considered them, the Court has yet to rule that if an agreement violates federal law, it is 
nonetheless enforceable.  Because the savings clause makes Congress’s intent clear that if an 
agreement is otherwise unlawful it is unenforceable, mandatory arbitration agreements 
containing class waivers by employers restrict employees’ Section 7 rights and therefore are 
unenforceable. The Fifth Circuit should clarify and simplify this area of the law and enforce the 
Board’s decision in D.R. Horton. 
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